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for much that goes on within their borders. Yet at the same
time, states are units of the nation and in our federal structure held to the commands of the national constitution and
the national laws.
Justice William J. Brennan
United States Supreme Court,
I.

INTRODUCTION

Should state courts use their own constitutions2 to resolve issues,
or defer to the interpretations 3 of the United States Supreme Court?
The debate remains quite spirited. 4 That states may interpret their
1. Brennan, Supreme Court Judge Versus United States Supreme Court Justice: A Change
in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 225, 227 (1966). Justice Brennan addressed
the dichotomy of the American federalistic system and the necessarily different perspective of
the state court judge who may tend to view the United States Supreme Court as usurping
state powers. Id.; see also Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 224

(1983) (the "overarching presence of federal law" restrains facile operation of state law).
2. See Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353, 356 (1984) (special problems may arise when
Supreme Court upholds a state action under a federal constitution provision creating a shadow
that serves as 'presumption of correctness"); see also Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 605 n.1 (1981) (expresses concern
regarding state courts' practice of avoiding Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree);
Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.CAL. L. REV. 750, 756 (1972) ("difficult
question of propriety" if state court wishes to avoid Supreme Court review merely for fear of
narrow interpretations of rights); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: JudicialActivism Among
State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 732, 787 (1982) (justification suspect when state
courts hold in contradistinction to Supreme Court merely because of ideological differences).
3. See, e.g., People v. Norman, 112 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Ct. App. 1974), vacated, 14 Cal. 3d 939,
538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975) (superseded by statute as stated in People v. Daan,
161 Cal. App. 3d, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Ct. App. 1984)); People v. Level, 117 Cal. App. 3d 462,
172 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Ct. App. 1981) (opinion withdrawn by order of court June 25, 1981); State
v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
4. The debate is most controversial in criminal procedure, where Warren Court liberality
has been the subject of careful reassessment. For comprehensive treatment of the criminal
procedure developments, see C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 866-77 (2d ed. 1986) (overview of state court departures

from restrictive Supreme Court holdings). See also Hancock, State CourtActivism and Searches
Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085 (1982) (detailed analysis of search incident doctrine
and three models of state court activism); Schaffer, Harmon, & Helbrush, Robinson At Large
in the Fifty States: A Continuationof the State Bill of Rights Debate in the Search and Seizure
Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (1974) (historical analysis, case law, and procedure for
application of state law examined in fourth amendment area); Welsh, Whose Federalism? The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
819 (1983) (Burger Court's type of federalism treated in light of civil liberties); Wilkes, The
New Federalismin CriminalProcedure:State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J.
421 (1974) (a seminal article in the field of state independent constitutional adjudication on
criminal procedure issues).
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own constitutions to expand individual rights5 guaranteed by the federal government is beyond contention. Recent state court independence,' however, has heightened the controversy over the proper interrelationship between the state and federal constitutions. States that
were formerly conciliatory are now more assertiveJ and a few jurisdictions seem almost recalcitrant." Stern warnings from the Supreme

5. For Supreme Court support of state court expansion of individual liberties, see PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4
(1975); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977)
(without protective force of state law, liberties not fully realized); Utter, Freedom and Diversity
in a FederalSystem: Perspectiveon State Constitutions and Washington Declarationof Rights,
7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 493 (1984) (state constitutions may be more protective of

individual rights than United States Constitution).
6. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 133, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976) ("We pause.., to reaffirm the independent nature of the California Constitution
and our responsibility to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens despite
conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution.");
see also Hancock, supra note 4, at 1110-11 n.93 (extensive listing of independent decisions by
the particularly active states of California, Alaska, and Hawaii, as well as independent rulings
by Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).
7. See Swindler, Minimum Standards of ConstitutionalJustice: Federal Floor and State
Ceiling, 49 Mo. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1984). Professor Swindler notes:
The Missouri Supreme Court, for example ....
undertook to reassert a long-held
theory of political science that a state constitution is not a grant of power but only
a limitation of a power which is "practically absolute." Although this appears to
be a restatement of old state sovereignty doctrine, in the context of the changed
national character of American constitutionalism it becomes an assertion of a revitalized state constitutionalism.
Id. (citing Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1029 (1976)).
Professor Swindler also mentions that Virginia, a conservative state, has likewise considered
the Supreme Court's decisions to set the minimum standards whose protections may be widened
under state constitutional law. See id. at 15.
8. Alaska has frequently based its holdings on the Alaska Constitution. See supra note 6.
A strong statement of independence was made in Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386,
401-02 (Alaska 1970):
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us by
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights
under our Alaska Constitution .

. .

. We need not stand by idly and passively,

waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court of the land.
A similarly independent statement is made in State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369, 520 P.2d
51, 58 (1974). The court stated:
[Als the ultimate judicial tribunal in this state this court has final, unreviewable
authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution. We have not hesitated
in the past to extend the protections of the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of
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Court express disapproval of independent adjudication 9 and bring his-

torical notions of federalism into question.
Although criminal procedure has been an especially fertile ground
for independent state court adjudication, 10 this dispute affects many2
other fields of law: first amendment free speech,1" equal protection,1
economic regulation, 13 the right to bear arms,14 religion,'1 the environment, 16 the right to privacy, 7 and education.'s

textually parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights when logic and a sound
regard for the purpose of those protections have so warranted.
Id.; see also People v. Brisendien, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
326 (1975) (holding based on California Constitution, which required "a more exacting standard
for cases arising within this state").
9. See, e.g., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (suggests
state residents amend state law to comply with "rational law enforcement").
10. See supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., Wilson v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468, 474-75 (1975) (state protections of free speech exceeded those of federal Constitution);
Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 228 Or. 405, 365 P.2d 845 (decision based on Oregon
Constitution in defamation action), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 157 (1961); State v. Beno, 116 Wis.
2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668, 674 (1984) (Wisconsin courts not restricted to Supreme Court interpretation of federal speech clause).
12. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92-93 (1983) (state
provision for equal protection applies to funding for schools); People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 74
(Colo. 1981) (en banc) (state provision for equal protection demands crime classification relate
to state interests).
13. Economic regulation has received a singularly laissez-faire treatment by the Supreme
Court. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) ("Whether the legislature takes for
its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spenser, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours.").
Such indifference has spawned more careful analysis by the state courts. See Bulova Watch Co.
v. Brand Distrib., 285 N.C. 467, 477-78, 206 S.E.2d 141, 148-49 (1974) (North Carolina Constitution prohibited fair trade laws under theory of economic due process).
14. See, e.g., State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630 P.2d 824 (1981) (right to bear arms rests
on state constitutional provision).
15. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 59 Del. 196, 200-01, 216 A.2d 668, 671, (1966) (Delaware
Constitution could not sanction bus transportation for students attending private schools).
16. See Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 912-16 (1976) (listing of state constitutional provisions protecting the
environment).
17. See State v. Elliot, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975) (state sodomy law
violated right to privacy).
18. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976) (holding that money spent on public schools could not be a function of district's tax
base in contradistinction to Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (New Jersey Constitution required equal educational opportunities
for all children), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
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This note first analyzes the history and evolution of federalism,
then examines the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds,
along with recent developments resulting from the Supreme Court's
decision in Michigan v. Long. 19 Next, theoretical arguments commonly
advanced against aggressive use of state constitutions are explored.
Special attention is devoted to Florida's antifederalistic ° constitutional
amendment,21 which requires Florida courts to construe fourth amendment rights in conformity with United States Supreme Court decisions.
A recommended approach is suggested for state courts and Florida

practitioners.

II.

FEDERALISM AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The states were historically the first to guarantee individual
rights.2 2 Before the federal Constitution was enacted, all but one of
the thirteen original states had adopted constitutions2 that provided
such protections as freedom of the press, the right to a speedy jury
trial, assistance of counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and freedom from self-incrimination.- The federal Bill of Rights was largely

19. 463 U.S. 1032 (1982).
20. The author uses the word "antifederalistic" because the amendment restricts federalism
to that advanced by the federal government only. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (5th ed.
1979) defines federalism as 'Term which includes interrelationships among the states and relationship between the states and the federal government." It is precisely this interrelationship that
is breached when the association is operative only on one side.
See also Dauer & Havard, The Florida Constitution of 1885 - A Critique, 8 U. FLA. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1955). According to Dauer and Havard, federalism requires a division of powers:
The principle of federalism complicates our national constitutional structure, inasmuch as it implies a division of legal sovereignty between the central government
and its constituent members, the states. This factor is extremely important to the
constitutional picture in this country, because provision must be made not only for
deciding what powers are to be assigned and what limitations are to be placed on
government but also how a division of these legitimate basic powers is to be made
between the national and state governments.
Id. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
21. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982) (search and seizure in Florida must be
construed in conformity with fourth amendment to United States Constitution).
22. Dauer & Havard, supra note 20, at 6 ("After all, the first state constitutions were
drafted prior to the Federal Constitution, and much of the latter's content was derived from
the former.").
23. R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY
111 (1957) (the one state that had not yet adopted a constitution was Rhode Island); see Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 955 (1982).
24. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering States' Bills of Rights, 3 U. BALT. L. REV.
.379, 381 (1980); see Dauer & Havard, supra note 20, at 27. The Florida Constitution's Declaration
of Rights was written in 1885 and follows the Federal Constitution with a few additions. Id.
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based on state constitutions,2 and intended to supplement rather than
substitute for protections provided by the states.2 6 The United States
thus has a dual system of protection that requires participation from
both the states and the national government for effective protection
27
of liberties.
The tenth amendment supports the historical evidence that states
were intended to be sovereign entities in protecting individual liberties. The amendment provides that "powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."' Although

See also R. POUND, supra note 23, at 82-111 (1957). State bills of rights written after the
federal Bill of Rights have generally followed the federal model. Those written first, however,
often contained a disparate panoply of protections. Id. at 83. For example, New Hampshire
and Pennsylvania prohibited taking of property for public use without compensation. Id. Pennsylvania also provided for the right to migrate, which later appeared in the privileges and immunities
clause. Id. at 84. North Carolina and Maryland prohibited monopolies well in advance of the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Id. Provision for security of life, liberty, and property found
expression in many state constitutions, such as that of Georgia, which also had a habeas corpus
provision. Id. at 86. With respect to the rights of criminal defendants, several states required
one or more of the following: accused must be supported by witnesses on his behalf; general
warrants may not be issued; self-incrimination may not be required; cruel and unusual punishment
is banned; and no excessive bail should be exacted. Id. at 86-89. Pound notes that these rights,
first derived from the common experiences of the English, were transferred to the thirteen
original states and then to the national government. Id. at 111. Since the federal Court is now
in a period of retrenchment, see, e.g., Wilkes, supra note 4, at 421, the independent power of
the state to adjudicate on the basis of its constitution assumes renewed importance.
25. Dauer & Havard, supra note 20, at 6.
26. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 5, at 497:
It is by now commonplace to note that the state constitutions were originally
intended as the primary devices to protect individual rights, and the United States
Bill of Rights was intended as a secondary layer of protection against the power
of a weak central government with very limited powers. Perhaps that is why state
courts have often been the first to develop techniques for protecting individual
rights and the United States Supreme Court later adopted and read into the United
States Constitution.
27. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 5, at 503.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X. As a point of comparison, the West German Constitution, the
Basic Law, provides for individual units of Germany, called Lander, which may legislate in
areas not preempted by the federal government: "The Linder shall have the right to legislate
in so far as this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation." GRUNDGESETZ
[GG] art. 70, § 1 (W. Ger.).
The individual Linder, like the American states, have their own constitutions, resulting in
a dual system of federalism. See, e.g., Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the

United States: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1104 (1960) (rights in addition to those
in their Basic Law are protected by separate state constitutions). The Basic Law, however,
like the United States Constitution, provides for a sort of supremacy clause: "Federal law shall
override Land law." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 31 (W. Ger.). The result of this provision, when
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the amendment has had a checkered history,2 it is not dead.30 The
coupled with article 70, which allows state legislation only in the absence of federal law overriding
it, leaves little room for Land independence. See Kauper, supra, at 1142. One interesting
characteristic of German constitutional law provides for federal law to be drawn or framed in
the rough, with the details filled in by the individual Land. This is set out as follows in the
German Constitution:
Subject to the conditions laid down in Article 72, the Federation shall have the
right to enact skeleton provisions concerning:
1. the legal status of persons in the public service of the Lander, communes, or
other corporate bodies under public law, in so far as Article 74a does not provide
otherwise;
la. the general principles governing higher education;
2. the general legal status of the press and the film industry;
3. hunting, nature conservation and landscape management;
4. land distribution, regional planning, and water regime;
5. matters relating to the registration of changes of residence or domicile and to
identity cards.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 75 (W. Ger.). This article thus empowers the German government to
set up legal frameworks, which the individual Land will fill in. Article 75 mentions only five
areas for treatment as skeleton provisions. In contradistinction to the American system, the
various Lander have responsibility for actually enforcing the laws made by the national government. See Kauper, supra, at 1151. Since states are burdened with enforcement of federal laws,
approximately two-thirds of the tax money raised is apportioned to the Lander. Id. at 1147. In
the final analysis, the German system of federalism is one in which the national government is
substantially more powerful than the Lander. By comparison, the American states have much
greater independence. Id. at 1157.
29. The rise and fall of the tenth amendment is evident in recent times in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (held a federal law unconstitutional on federalistic grounds
for first time in 40 years). The case has, however, after a "truncated existence," been overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (drawing boundaries
between traditional governmental functions unworkable and inconsistent with federalism).
The phrase "truncated existence" comes from Professor Moffat's comparison of the life of a
legal rule to the rise and fall of a scientific principle. See Moffat, JudicialDecisionas Paradigm:
Case Studies of Morality and Law in Interatian,37 U. FLA. L. REv. 297, 324-37 (1985). The
model looks at the rules of judicial decisions as paradigms. Id. at 324. Thomas Kuhn described
the life of a scientific theory by reference to paradigms that retain validity as long as they
satisfactorily explain the phenomenon. Id. But as problems develop whose solutions may not
be found within the confines of the paradigm, questions arise concerning the theory's utility.
Alternative explanations are advanced that will better solve the problems, until at one point a
new paradigm replaces the old one. Id. at 325.
Professor Moffat provides Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) as an example of a
truncated paradigm. See Moffat, supra, at 332-33. In Furman,the Supreme Court disallowed
the death penalty if imposing it were left to the untrammeled discretion of the jury. The capital
punishment opponents, however, had a temporary victory, which fell with the decision in Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See Moffat, supra, at 333. Gregg sustained the constitutionality
of new state statutes drafted to meet the requirements in Furman, and undercut the new
paradigm Furman had established only four years earlier. Id. at 334. The Furman decision
was thus "truncated" and replaced by another paradigm whose rationale was more in keeping
with the values of society. Id. at 335.
30. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). Justice Marshall stated:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism," stating merely
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powers of the national government were narrowly defined to allow
states the freedom to regulate the affairs of their own citizens without
undue federal influence.31
Nor were the state bills of rights intended to mirror only those
rights provided in the federal Constitution.s2 State constitutions must
reflect the views of each state's citizenry rather than simply duplicating
federal provisions, and inspire confidence in the laws and institutions
created by the instrument. Unless the people believe the laws truly
represent their interests, the states' functioning will be impaired.'
that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, it
is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).

31. Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and
Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 215 (1981) ("state power was left almost unlimited, with very
few substantive constraints").
32. Many of the state constitutions preceded the federal drafting. These clearly cannot be
seen as mere reflections of the federal protections. See supra notes 22-24. But even the state
constitutions that were written after the federal drafting were not dependent upon national
guarantees. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1356 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("The duty

to protect individual rights, a duty that both our federal structure and their own constitutions
impose on the states, requires that state courts not regard their constitutions as mere mirrors
of federal protections.").
33.

See Dauer & Havard, supra note 20, at 3; see also L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF

LAW 19-27 (rev. ed. 1969). Fuller equates the morality of duty with the economics of exchange,
which rest upon "reciprocity." Id. at 19. There are "three conditions for optimum realization of
the notion of duty, the conditions that make a duty most understandable and palatable to the
man who owes it." Id. at 23-24. The three conditions may be succinctly described as (1) the
relationship from which the duty arises must be voluntary, (2) the values exchanged must be
equal, and (3) the relationships must be reversible. Id. at 23. Subsequent use of the term
"reciprocity" in this Note is in the sense of the word as defined by Fuller's exchange theory.
Fuller discusses in this connection the Commodity Exchange Theory of Law of Soviet jurisprudence scholar, Eugene Pashukanis. Id. at 24. Pashukanis viewed reciprocity as a market
event of bargained exchange, which was a trait of capitalism inconsistent with a Marxist state.
See L. FULLER, supra, at 24. This theory is then applied to morals, with the resulting disappearance of both legal rights and duties. Id. at 25. As Powell stated, "[s]ince Pashukanis views
the morality of duty as coexistent with and dependent upon the economy of the marketplace,
he assumes the two will disappear arm in arm." Powell, The Legal Nihilism of Pashukanis, 20
U. FLA. L. REV. 18, 32 (1967). Pashukanis' work is treated in Pashukanis, The GeneralTheory
of Law and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 115-25 (J. Hazard ed., H. Babb trans.
1951). See also R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 160-61 (rev. ed.

1954) (synopsis of Pashukanis' thought); Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the
Development of MarxistLegal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157-66 (1949) (summary of Pashukanis'
theory). For the practical applications and utility of jurisprudence for the practicing attorney,
see generally A Symposium on Jurisprudence,Focus: The Lawyer, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 395-565
(1967).
34. See supra note 30.
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The United States Supreme Court defines the irreducible standards
of federal constitutional protections.- The states are free, however,
to expand the limits of individual liberties, 36 even when the Supreme
Court has denied a right under federal provisions. For example, in
3
Washington v. Chrisman,7
a student was convicted of possession of
drugs after the arresting officer, who had followed the student to his
dormitory room, spotted marijuana from the doorway. The Washington
court held that the fourth amendment prohibited the officer from entering the room Without a search warrant or exigent circumstances.8
The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the fourth amendment to
allow the officer to monitor the movements of an arrestee.3 9 On remand, however, instead of capitulating to the interpretation of the
Supreme Court, the state court held that the officer's action was
impermissible on the basis of the Washington Constitution.40 The federal government, then, sets the constitutionally mandated "floor" for
individual rights, and the states set the "ceiling."41

35. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 389. States cannot abrogate individual rights
granted by the federal Constitution. States have, however, sometimes held that a particular
protection is not required under its own state constitution. A notable recent example is the
Oregon Supreme Court's rejection of the necessity for Miranda warnings. See Yunker, Oregon
Court Rejects Miranda Approach, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 3. The decision only rejects
Miranda's protections on the basis of the Oregon Constitution, and does not rely on federal
constitutional protections. State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 894 (1986). The decision is
invalid if Miranda is required by the federal Constitution. But some judges, such as Chief
Justice Rehnquist, do not seem to think Miranda is constitutionally required. See, e.g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974) (significance of the case unclear, but may mean a trial judge is free to
balance the equities in determining whether certain evidence may be admitted notwithstanding
a violation of Miranda). Under this analysis, as far as federalism is concerned, the Oregon
decision would be valid because it abridged no minimum federal right. See, e.g., Utter, supra
note 5, at 493 ('The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that state courts may
interpret state constitutions to be more protective of individual rights than the United States
Constitution.").
36. Williams, supra note 2, at 354 ("It is now well recognized that state courts may interpret
their constitutions to provide different and more extensive rights than those provided by the
federal constitution.").
37. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
38. State v. Chrisman, 94 Wash. 2d 711, 716, 619 P.2d 971, 973 (1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1
(1982).
39. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 7.
40. 100 Wash. 2d at 817-18, 676 P.2d at 422; see also Roberts, The Adequate and Independent
State Ground: Some PracticalConsiderations,19 LAND & WATER L. REv. 65-52 (1984) (important point that even a Supreme Court reversal without a remand may be treated as a remand
and the former state holding reaffirmed on basis of state law).
41. See Swindler, supra note 7.
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The historical system of dual federalism, in which the federal government was supreme in areas delegated to it by the Constitution,
and states were able to operate without interference in the remaining
fields, has deteriorated only in the past few decades. 42 Commentators
characterize this change as a move from a cooperative system to a
federally dominated one. 45 The fact that state courts feel compelled to
justify their divergence from the Supreme Court evidences dual
federalism's decline from the early period of this century. "
The states' role in federalism declined partly from selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, which
applied federal protections to the states.4 5 Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights was very beneficial to individuals, who had more frequent
contact with state rather than national government. The effect of this
extension, however, was to reduce the importance of state constitutions by making the federal Constitution the standard for individual
6
liberties.4

42. See Walker, American Federalism - Then and Now, 24 THE BOOK OF THE STATES
23, 23 (1982) (notwithstanding federal expansion of authority from 1865-1930, Madison's dual
federalism was still intact until around 1940).
43. Id. at 23-24.
44. See Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV.
165, 176 (1984) ("When they depart from federal decisions, state courts often begin by explaining
that the Supreme Court permits them to interpret their state's law in their own way - a sign
of how far we have lost sight of basic federalism.").
45. In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), an opinion by John
Marshall, the Bill of Rights was held not to be directly binding upon the states. Id. at 243.
46. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103-04
(2d ed. 1978). Bickel states:
The Warren Court was quick to impose the same norms on state and national
governments alike. In dealing with the obscenity problem, for example, the Court
would not heed Mr. Justice Harlan's plea that separate rules might be made applicable to the federal government and to state and local governments . . . . Again
in its decisions on criminal procedure - decisions concerning, for example, unreasonable searches and seizures - the Warren Court sought to enforce national
uniformity in every detail, without regard, so to speak, to varieties of criminal
experience.
The Warren Court, in short, took charge of the state of affairs and attempted to impose
uniformity across the board. Id. at 104-05.
See also Douglas, State Judicial Activism - The New Role for State Bill of Rights, 12
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1978) (federalization of rights has resulted in a "withering"
of state constitutional adjudication); Note, The Warren Court:A Study of Selected Civil Liberties,
20 U. FLA. L. REV. 201, 225 (1967) (although federal government may have gained nothing by
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, states have nonetheless lost their formerly absolute discretion
over their citizens' activities).
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Federalism, however, does not function as designed when the state
half of the dual model is inoperative. 47 As a result, states have recently
ignored their historical role as "laboratories" where new ideas and
concepts are forged. 48 In addition, states have often failed to pay

serious attention to their own constitutions, even when decisions would
49
more logically and readily flow from applying state law.
Evidence of a change in the old habit of following the Supreme
Court is beginning to surface. States that were dormant, even lazy,
have begun to awaken, perhaps disturbed by the slow but steady
erosion of individual liberties first provided by the Warren Court.50
The reassumption of the states' proper role in the federalistic scheme
may prove vital to preservation of individual liberties51 and result in
a resurgence of state law.52
III.

THE ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT
STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE

A.

History

The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine allows states
to resolve issues on the basis of state law without being subject to
Supreme Court review.- The doctrine is derived from article III of
the Constitution, which states that judicial power extends "to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ...

."

If

47. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 503 ("Federalism is not served when the federal half of
that protection is crippled.").
48. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state, may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
49. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Randon Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J.
371, 385 (1984) (government has become "lopsided" and since rights are not taken seriously in
Washington, neither are they taken seriously by the states); see also Dauer & Havard, supra
note 20, at 6 (state law is so low in hierarchy of laws that state constitutions have suffered
from a lack of esteem).
50. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 494-95 (state courts may disagree with trend of United
States Supreme Court to pull back from Boyd principle, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), whereby the Court was solicitous of the people's constitutional rights).
51. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 491 (without state law full realization of liberties cannot
be guaranteed).
52. See Collins, supra note 49, at 376-77 ("As state courts reassert their proper role in our
federalist system, we are likely to see less, rather than more, direct reliance on federal case
law.").
53. See infra note 57.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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there is no case or controversy because the matter was decided on
state grounds without violating the supremacy clause, then the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision.55. See Schaffer, Harmon & Helbrush, supra note 4, at 21. The American model of a
Supreme Court is very different from the model used in most European countries. See, e.g.,
L. FAVOREU, LES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES 5 (1986), in which he states:
In the American system, constitutional law is entrusted to the whole of the court
system and is not distinguished from ordinary law in so far as all the cases, as
long as the court has proper jurisdiction, are judged by the same courts, and
appreciably in the same manner. The constitutional issue may be presented in all
litigation, and it does not require special treatment. Actually, there is no constitutional litigation, any more than there is administrative or judicial litigation, because
there is no reason to distinguish between the suits brought before the judge.
Id. (trans. by Note author). Thus the European system reflects a different philosophy, that of
establishing the constitutional jurisdiction of a court outside the framework used in the system
overall. In the United States, the Supreme Court sits at the apex of the judiciary, while in
Europe the constitutional jurisdiction is vested in a separate court. Id.
In Germany, for example, the separate constitutional court is the Federal Constitutional
Court. This independent court meets in Karlsruhe in two divisions, termed "senates," and
decides conflicts between such entities as the federal government and the Ldinder, or between
two Lnder. See N. HORN, H. KOTz, & H. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 20-21 (1982) [hereinafter N. HORN]. This court interprets the German
Constitution although it is not properly termed a court of appeal deciding constitutional issues
arising from criminal or civil cases. Rather, the court has original jurisdiction in areas provided
for in article 93 of the Basic Law. See Documents on Politicsand Society in the FederalRepublic
of Germany, LAW ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 7 (1982); see generally Hahn,
Trends in the Jurisprudenceof the German Federal ConstitutionalCourt, 26 AM. J. Coaip. L.
631 (1978) (discussing the court's function, principles of interpretation and general direction).
On aspects of the German court system, see Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization:
The German Design From an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COsIp. L. REV. 27
(1981) (explanation of the German court system and possible beneficial applications to the American system). See also Riegert, The West German Civil Code, Its Origins and Its Contract
Provisions, 45 TUL. L. REV. 48 (1970) (excellent review of historical development and organization of German Civil Code with special section detailing contract provisions).
The European system came about because of the work of the most famous positivist in this
century, Hans Kelsen. See Kelsen, On the Pure Theory of Law, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 1 (1966)
(brief explanation of Kelsen's own philosophy of positive law and the basic norm). According to
Favoreu,
The European model, which today is known in ten or so forms, would not have
existed without Kelsen. Through his work and through his drafting of the Austrian
Constitution in 1920, the Master of Vienna put in place a new type of constitutional
law, in opposition to the American model.
L. FAVOREU, supra, at 5 (trans. by Note author).
Thus, the Europeans rejected the American approach in favor of the system created by
Kelsen. The primary reason for rejecting the American model of constitutional adjudication was
its perceived "insufficient rigidity." Id. at 10. For European tastes, the United States Supreme
Court simply was able to declare laws unconstitutional and unilaterally change the Constitution.
To a European community accustomed to a positivist outlook dating back to Austin, this was
totally unacceptable. Id. For general overviews of European and comparative constitutional
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In the 1875 landmark decision of Murdock v. Memphis,56 the Supreme Court held it would not review state court decisions containing
a federal question if an adequate and independent state ground existed
upon which its decision rested. 57 The Supreme Court set forth its
policy on the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine in Herb
v. Pitcairn.6 Justice Jackson's majority opinion explained why state
decisions on independent grounds should stand:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to

the principle that it will not review judgments of state courts
that rest on adequate and independent state grounds. The
reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems and in the limitation of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct
wrong judgments, not to revise opinions59
This recognition of the division of power and the dualistic nature of
federalism was crucial to the development of the state grounds doctrine.

adjudicatory systems, see M. CAPPELLETTI

& W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW (1979); C. EISENMANN, LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE ET LA HAUTE COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE D'AUTRICHE (1928); L. FAVOREU & L. PHILIP, LE CONSEIL CON-

ed. 1985).
56. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
57. Id. at 635. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Sta. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2718 (1982)). Section 25 of the Judiciary Act stated:
STITUTIONNEL (3d

That a final judgment ... in any suit, in the highest court of law ... of a State,
* . . where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of ...
the

United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of.. . any State, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution . . . of the United States, and the decision is in
favour of such their [sic] validity, or where is drawn in question the construction
of any clause of the constitution...

,

privilege or exemption specially set up
the said Constitution .

. . ,

and the decision is against the title, right,
...

by either party, under such clause of

[the judgment] may be re-examined and reversed or

affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error ....
Id. § 25. See also, e.g., D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 142 (1968)
(highly probable that all questions passed on by state courts were reviewable by the Supreme
Court); Schaffer, Harmon & Helbrush, supra note 5, at 21 (section 1257 does not limit court
review to only federal questions).
58. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
59. Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
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The Herb Court also addressed how it should treat cases in which
the decision did not clearly rest on state grounds6 ° In some such
instances, the Court declined review, presuming state grounds were
the reason for the state court decision. On other occasions, the Court
remanded cases to the state court for further consideration. 1 The
presumption that a state had adjudicated on adequate and independent
grounds was a very strong one, even when the opinion conveyed the
impression that the decision was based directly on federal law.62 The
reason for this deferential treatment was apparently to allow states
3
to exercise their proper role in the dual system of federalism.6
Another problem considered in Herb was the situation in which a
case involved both state and federal questions.6 The state court would
often discuss both questions together, and render a decision without
distinguishing between the two. As a result, the Supreme Court could
not determine whether state or federal law controlled the decision,
and had no rational basis for either taking jurisdiction or abstaining.6
The Herb Court respected state courts and therefore rejected a policy
of simply telling the state court what it meant by its decision.6 As
later cases reveal, these basic tenets of the unreviewable state grounds
decision and the division of federal and state powers broke down,
leading many states to avoid the Supreme Court when its decisions
invaded traditional state authority.67

60. Id. at 126.
61. Id. at 126-27.
62. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). The Supreme Court
noted that the Minnesota court cited no specific provision of its state constitution, and probably
based its holding on the five cases it cited that relied on the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
554-55; see also International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Sur. Co., 297 U.S. 657, 662 (1936)
(continuance granted to allow reargument in state court to clarify basis of the decision).
63. See National Tea, 309 U.S. at 557. The court stated:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting
their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure
adjudications . . . not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court ....
This is not a mere technical rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the
division of authority between this Court and state courts and is of equal importance
to each.
Id.; see generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 56-58 (11th ed. 1985) (state grounds
may be either substantive or procedural, although it may be difficult to discern the independence
of the decision).
64. 324 U.S. at 127.
65. Id. The Court wrote in terms of "interlaced" discussions without any "sharp separation"
of the federal and state question. Id.
66. Id. at 128 (remanding may impose burden on state courts but is in their best interest
since it protects state jurisdiction from Supreme Court interference).
67. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
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B.

Michigan v. Long

State courts have recently decided issues relying on their own
constitutions, although they often appeared to rely on federal jurisprudence. Such decisions were insulated from Supreme Court review as
long as some brief statement of independent state grounds was provided.68 Apparently displeased with these unreviewable state court
decisions,69 the Supreme Court set out the new approach to the state
grounds doctrine in Michigan v. Long. 0
In Long, the defendant's car was searched before he was arrested
and the Michigan Supreme Court suppressed marijuana found as a
"fruit" of the illegal search.71 Although the state court referred to its
constitution twice, the Supreme Court noted that the main thrust of
the opinion relied on federal law72 and found jurisdiction for the case.7
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion examined the Court's prior hand-

68. See supra note 57.
69. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 63, at 58.
70. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
71. Id. at 1036-37. The metaphorical expression in full is 'Truit of the poisonous tree,"
coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The
doctrine may be viewed as an extension of the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence is excluded
because it was obtained in an unconstitutional manner. The concept was advanced by Justice
Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
There are three exceptions to the exclusion of evidence classified as "fruit." The first exception, attenuation, allows evidence to be used if a weak causal link exists between the illegality
and the later legal discovery of evidence. See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982)
(6 hour lapse between illegal arrest and confession not enough to dissipate taint); Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108 (1980) (taint from illegal arrest attenuated because of so-called
congenial atmosphere); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (demonstrates proposition that evidence need not be excluded on the mere basis of a "but for" causal link).
A second exception, inevitable discovery, allows illegally obtained "fruits" into evidence if
it can be shown that the evidence would have been found even without the illegality. See Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (illegally obtained statement of location of victim's body not
suppressed since police would have found body without the statement within a few hours).
The final exception to the suppression of illegal fruit is the independent source rule. If
authorities can show they could have legally obtained the evidence from another source, the
tainted evidence need not be excluded. See Crews v. United States, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (in-court
identification admissible though arrest was illegal since police had independent sources to identify
defendants).
See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 34-68 (general discussion
of fruit of poisonous tree doctrine and exclusionary rule).
72. Long, 463 U.S. at 1037.
73. Id. at 1044.
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ling of the state grounds doctrine. 74 First, the "ad hoc" method,
whereby the Court remanded some cases and reviewed others, was
rejected as inconsistent. 75 Next, the process of examining state law
was discarded because it required the Court to interpret state law
with which the Justices were unfamiliar. 76 Finally, the Court noted
the "burden" of remanding decisions to the state court when independ77
ent state grounds were not clear.
The Court rejected prior methods of dealing with the independent
state grounds doctrine and decided to review decisions unless they
clearly and expressly rested on state grounds.7 The new test provides
that:
[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal
law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,
we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make
clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that
the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
79
court has reached.
The new test for the Court was drawn out of "respect for the
independence of state courts" and a desire to avoid advisory opinions.8,
The Court also contended that asking for a clarification of the grounds
for the decision was intrusive, and the presumption of federal grounds

74. Id. at 1038-39 (Justice O'Connor examines state law and cites cases to show the different
treatment accorded the issue, ranging from dismissal to remand). Id.
75. Id. at 1039.
76. Id. The Court states: "The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it
requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar, and which often, as
in this case, have not been discussed at length by the parties." Id. This vow of non-interpretation
of state law is violated five pages later in the opinion when a thorough analysis of Michigan
state law is undertaken, notwithstanding the Justices' general unfamiliarity. Id. at 1044-45 n.10;
see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 1040.
78. Id. at 1038-40.
79. Id. at 1040-41.
80. Id. at 1040.
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would avoid this intrusion. The Court suggested that this practice

would give states the opportunity to develop their own jurisprudence
without Supreme Court interference.sl
The decision in Long charted a new course for the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine. Prior to Long, the Court generally
displayed caution in reviewing decisions arguably based on state
grounds.3 The new approach changed the presumption that a decision
rests on state grounds to one that it does not.8 If the face of the

opinion fails to reveal an adequate state ground, the Supreme Court
will now assert jurisdiction.
The rule will probably encourage state prosecutors to argue that

state grounds are not truly independent, and that the Supreme Court
should therefore take jurisdiction.-- Should the Supreme Court agree
to review in such cases, it will have to interpret state law. The majority
opinion's Willinguess to examine state grounds in Longs may indicate
that the Court will move toward a standard of general review in the
future.c
Several of Long's concepts require particularly close scrutiny.
First, Justice O'Connor stated that an important need for uniformity
in federal law went unsatisfied when the Court did not review opinions
based on federal lawY1 Uniformity breaks down just as readily, how-

81. Id. at 1041. The Court states:
It also avoids the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to
clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that such an
approach will provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state
jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity
of federal law.
Id.
82. See suppra note 63.
83. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
84. See Collins, supra note 49, at 399-400 n.87 (discussing case in which the state argued
the state court's grounds were not sufficient).
85. Long, 463 U.S. at 1044-45 n.10 (majority opinion canvasses in depth the Michigan
Constitution and case law in determining the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction even
without presuming the instant case rests on inadequate state grounds).
86. As Justice Stevens points out in Long, thirty years ago the Court reviewed only one
case in which the state courts sought to reverse decisions in favor of a defendant's rights. Id.
at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the 1983 term, however, Justice Stevens remarked that
states themselves had filed at least eighty petitions for certiorari. Id. at 1070 n.3; see also
Wilkes, supra note 4, at 444-50. Wilkes, writing nine years before Michigan v. Long, speculates
on possible narrowing techniques the Supreme Court could use to obviate the adequate and
independent state grounds concept. Id.
87. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040. Justice O'Connor states dismissal is not a "panacea" because
of the need for uniformity. Id.
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ever, whether a state court diverges from the Supreme Court on state
grounds or on federal grounds. For example, if the Michigan court
had persuaded the Supreme Court that it had decided the case on the
basis of the Michigan Constitution, resulting law would have been just
as divergent as if the Court had not reviewed. Thus, when Justice
O'Connor argues that such state decisions should be reviewed to insure
uniformity, she in effect rejects the state branch of the dual federalism
model,8 and approaches in logic, if not in practice, a procedure of
general review. 89
In a second statement, the Court characterized continuance or
remand to the state court for clarification as an unsatisfactory method
of determining whether adequate state grounds existed. But the
Court's reasons for the inadequacy of these methods were surprising.
Vacation for clarification was termed a "burden";9° remanding a case
"intrusive. "91

The Court's reasoning is difficult to follow. If state courts are free
to adjudicate on the basis of their own state law as long as federal
supremacy is not violated, a range of responses exists to resolve ambiguously grounded decisions. The Court could presume that state
grounds existed, and refuse to take jurisdiction.92 This model could
be termed "deferential." Or, the Court could simply disregard the
intent of the state court and conclusively presume the decision was
decided on federal grounds.9 3 This might be termed a "supremacy"
model. The Court's decision in Long lies closer to the supremacy model
than to the deferential model of former Supreme Courts.? While it
has not yet arrived at the supremacy model, the Court's rationalization
of Long as preserving "respect for the independence of state courts," 95
88. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 5, at 503 (dual protections of federalism); see also Dauer
& Havard, supra note 20 (federalism requires a division of power).
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040 ("[These methods of disposition place significant burdens on
state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of our jurisdiction.").
91. Id. at 1041 "[Reviewing a decision] also avoids the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice
of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court.").
92. The Court used to presume that state court decisions were independently grounded
when a decision was not clear on the matter. See supra notes 62-63.
93. See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 449 (discusses unlikelihood of Supreme Court's revising
the definition of "independent" to require state law be interpreted in accord with federal law).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
95. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040. The Court stated: "It is precisely because of this respect for
state courts ...
that we do not wish to continue to decide issues of state law that go beyond
the opinion that we review . . . ." Id. But see id. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am
thoroughly baffled by the Court's suggestion that it must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse

the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court in order to show '[r]espect for the independence
of state courts."').
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and relieving the state of burdens and intrusions, indulges in legerdemain.96
The Long test appears to be a mere cite-checking exercise, since
references to state law are required to support an independently
grounded decision.97 As a result, state courts may be reluctant to rely

96. Syllogistic reasoning would not posit a conclusion of "review" at the Supreme Court's
jurisprudential gates. An examination of the Court's premise might suggest restatement as
follows: "We have respect for state courts' independence and a desire to avoid advisory opinions
construing their own laws." The Court's conclusion may be phrased in this manner: "To avoid
deciding issues of state law, we will review their decision when we do not know whether state
law is the basis for the holding. Moreover, since it burdens a state to request clarification, we
will not attempt to discover whether we are reviewing state law, but will assume we are not."
Such an analysis signals that the Court has either improperly phrased its premise, or has
misstated its conclusion. See, e.g., A. WOLF, TEXTBOOK OF LOGIC 93 (2d ed. 1938), where he
states:
Sometimes an argument is really much stronger than it appears at first sight when
the omitted but assumed links have not yet been interpolated. But at other times
an argument in its abridged state may appear much stronger than it is when
completed, because some of the suppressed premises may appear more doubtful
when stated explicitly. In some cases an abridgment of an argument is due not so
much to want of time as to lack of candour.
It seems likely the conclusion is the Court's true opinion, while the stated premise is not. A
premise that would lead the Court to the desired conclusion might read as follows: "Federal
jurisprudence should be primary in the hierarchy of rules and all decisions reached on grounds
that can possibly be characterized as not independently based should be reviewed."
There is a tremendous array of opinion on what constitutes legal reasoning and the role of
syllogistic or deductive logic in the scheme. See W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 110 (1980),
which explains that legal opinions may use formal logic or inductive reasoning. Id. Most opinions
are written in the form of syllogisms. Id. This form of reasoning is perilous in that it may lead
to mechanical jurisprudence. Other forms of reasoning should be used, such as reasoning by
analogy. Id. Perelman thinks legal logic is properly inductive, rather than deductive, and a logic
of argumentation based on Aristotelian, dialectical proofs whose aim is to persuade the judge.
Perelman, What is Legal Logic?, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 1, 3 (1968). A common technique of legal
argumentation is reasoning by analogy. Id. Levi considers legal reasoning to be a pattern of
reasoning by example, from case to case. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
1 (1949). According to Levi, reasoning is a three-step process of viewing the similarities between
two cases, announcing the rule in the first case, and finally applying the rule to the second
case. Id. at 1-2. The American Legal Realists, however, might question the utility of legal
reasoning, given their generally skeptical outlook. In fact, the following words became the
Realists' credo: "And rules . . . are important to you so far as they help you see or predict
what judges will do or so far as they help you get judges to do something. That is their
importance. That is all their importance, except as pretty playthings." K. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRA %BLE BUSH 14 (1930). What is important to the Realists is not what the judge says, but
what the judge does. Id.
97. See Welsh, supra note 4, at 857 (Court's test for determining adequate state grounds
is exercise in cite checking).
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on federal precedent for fear of Supreme Court review. Thus, Long
may have undermined the Court's goal of making state courts adhere
to Supreme Court interpretation of federal law9s by establishing an
invasive policy that distorts the dual nature of federalism.9 9 The Court's

self-expanded jurisdiction may be a Pyrrhic victory that will ultimately
prove costly in terms of reduced prestige, authority, and leadership.,',,
IV.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE

To assess accurately the impact of state-based adjudication, it is
helpful to examine the substance and validity of the most frequently
articulated criticisms. Several of these criticisms have merit, and states
advocating independent decisionmaking must respond. While other
comments merely indicate disapproval of the dual system of federalism,
states must also address these arguments in justifying to skeptics
their right to decide on state grounds.
A. Perceived Dangers of Independent Analysi&
Some commentators think that allowing states to adjudicate on the
basis of their own constitutions frustrates the supremacy clause.','
Because the Supreme Court cannot review decisions on adequate and
independent state grounds, 0 2 these commentators contend, states can

98. See, e.g., id. at 858 (applicaton of state grounds doctrine thwarts goals Court should
seek to advance); see also Collins, supra note 49, at 403. Professor Collins writes:
The signal the Court is sending to its state counterparts is that decisional certainty
in vindicating rights will not occur unless state courts either abandon reliance on
federal decisional law or openly repudiate any such reliance. True a state court
may, under Long, employ federal law "for the purpose of guidance," but if it does
it must comply with the formalisms imposed by the Court, and even then mechanical
compliance may not be deemed "adequate" to preclude assumption of federal jurisdiction over the case.
Id.
99. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 4, at 857-58 (Court's definition of federalism leads to
"bizarre" results and discourages state experimentation by a rigid formalism).
100. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 49, at 407-08 ("In sum, Long and its progeny reveal that
the present Supreme Court is not about to assume the dominant role in protecting individual
rights. Thus, that responsibility could well shift to state courts."); see also Wilkes, supra note
4, at 450 (by lowering protections of individual liberties, state courts are "invited" to enlarge
on federal protections).
101. See, e.g., Bice, supra note 2, at 757.
102. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
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improperly insulate their decisions and undermine federalism by letting
federal issues go undecided. 1'
This argument has surface appeal, but proves deceptive on closer
analysis. The supremacy clause does not require the federal branch
to be supreme in all circumstances. m Although state courts are clearly
subject to Supreme Court review on matters concerning the federal
Constitution,115 they are not subservient with respect to their own
state constitutions. 106 State courts are the final and supreme interpreters of their own constitutions, and may interpret them in any manner
not inconsistent with the federal Constitution.107 Thus, to question the
validity of state court adjudication on the basis of state constitutions
in effect questions the validity of the state grounds doctrine, and
argues for federal supremacy of all law. °s
Other scholars express concern about states' abilities to evade Supreme Court decisions they dislike simply by deciding on the basis of

103. See Bice, supra note 2, at 757. Bice states: 'Thus the present operation of the adequate
state ground doctrine allows a state court, which may not be motivated by any concerns of
efficiency, to insulate its decisions from effective review by either the judicial or political processes for what may be a significant period." Id.; see also Bator, supra note 2, at 605 n.l: "I must
confess to some misgivings about the extent to which . . . state constitutional law is simply
'available' to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory."
104. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (3d ed.
1986) ("State courts are the final interpreters of state lav even though their actions are reviewable under the federal constitution, treaties, or laws.").
105. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. The Court's power to review state decisions derived
from Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Supreme Court voided a Georgia law that
impaired the obligation of contract in article I). The second major case reviewing state law was
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Supreme Court asserted its right as
final interpreter of Constitution and federal law). A third early case of major importance was
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821) (Federal Constitution superior to state
sovereignty). Perhaps the most illustrative modern example of federal supremacy is Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (governor and legislature of Arkansas refused to follow Court's desegregation order, and in response, Supreme Court forcefully reasserted its supremacy over states
in federal law). See generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supranote 104, at 15-22
(overview of Supreme Court's review of state court decisions and theories of judicial review);
Hall, "Think Things, Not Words": Judical Review in American ConstitutionalHistory, 35 U.
FLA. L. REV. 281-95 (1983) (examination of judicial review of Supreme Court by historical
period); Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributionsof Special
Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209-35 (1983) (surveys special theories of
judicial review, which have accomplished less than is generally imagined at the expense of
straining constitutional provisions).
106. See supra note 104, at 20.
107. Id. see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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their own constitutions.19 While it may be true that states disagree
with particular Supreme Court decisions and seek refuge in their own

constitutions, that action bears no impropriety. 110 Under both the relatively expansive interpretations of the Warren Court and the comparative retrenchment of the Burger Court, states avoided decisions
with which they did not concur. 111 Independent state court adjudication
therefore works both ways, favoring neither liberal nor conservative
viewpoints, as long as states do not violate the federal Constitution. 112
Individuals displeased with the Warren Court might have favored
independent state decisions at that time, while finding "evasion" disagreeable under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.11 But consistency
disallowed without reference
demands that a practice be allowed or 114
to a particular philosophical orientation.

109. See, e.g., Bice, supra note 2, at 757; see also Developments in the Law, supra note
32, at 1359 (commentators and judges uncomfortable with state decisions based on constitutions
that disagree with Supreme Court holding).
110. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
111. "Evasion" of Warren Court decisions took place in the 1960s when certain states,
mainly southern, viewed the Supreme Court as too expansive. See Beatty, State Court E'asion
of United States Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6
VAL. U.L. REV. 260, 283 (1972). Burger Court decisions were also avoided by states that
disagreed with the Court's penchant for narrowing individual liberties. See Wilkes, supra note
4, at 425-26. Wilkes states: "Against the background of the Burger Court decisions, the evasion
cases indicate that the nation is moving into a new period of federalism in criminal procedure
in which the state-based rights of criminal defendants will assume increasing significance as
federal-based rights play an ever-diminishing role." Id. at 426.
112. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 20 (states can
interpret their constitutions in any way that does not contradict federal law).
113. See Singer, Catcherin the Rye Jurisprudence,35 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (1983)
("Judges are accused of illegitimate 'activism' when they decide cases which involve highly
controversial and politicized issues. These accusations invariably come from individuals who
disagree with the outcomes of those cases.").
114. The judicial system operates on the basis of neutral principles. See, e.g., W.
REYNOLDS, supra note 96, at 63: "Wechsler defined a 'neutral principle' as one that a judge
would be willing to apply in all cases covered by the principle formulated by the court ....
The phrase 'neutral principles' has become part of our tradition." See Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing for adjudication on the
basis of neutral principles); see also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
141 (1921). Cardozo states:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles
....
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.
Id. According to Cardozo, therefore, the use of principles emphatically does not lead to mechanical
jurisprudence.
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Federalism is a dual system, with the federal element predominant
at some times, and the state element at other times. 115 The argument
against state-based decisions is simply an argument to tilt the power
permanently in favor of the federal branch, leaving no buffer between
the individual and the federal government." 6 The resulting federal
minimum of protection, 117 however, might not always coincide with
the demands of state residents who expect their rights to be based
upon a reciprocally beneficial relationship." i8 The Supreme Court is
not the only court capable of making correct decisions." 9

State courts have also been criticized for using their state constitutions in a result-oriented and sporadic manner, only to avoid those
Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree.120 Decisions made
on the basis of such convenience lack neutral criteria.12' Although state
courts should not decide similar cases differently without justification,
the difficulty lies in determining when a court is holding on state
grounds for convenience.'1 Merely to complain of a lack of neutral
principles is not enough. A critic must show that the state court is
insincere in holding on state grounds. What sincerity might mean is
not clear. For example, is a court insincere when it finds that the
state constitution requires a valid search warrant and disallows any
searches made with defective warrants?12 Does the motivation of the

115. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 503 (federal system provides a dual source of protection);
see also Schaffer, Harmon, & Helbush, supra note 4, at 20 (ability of states to expand rights
is feature of the dual judicial system); Swindler, supra note 7, at 1 (constitutional history is
"marked by a series of pendulum swings").
116. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 497.
117. See Swindler, supra note 7, at 1 (federal branch supplies the minimum and states the
maximum protection of individual rights).
118. See Fuller, supra note 33, at 19-27.
119. See Williams, supra note 2, at 402 ("The United States Supreme Court does not have
a monopoly on correct constitutional interpretation. This fact is a cornerstone of federalism,
justifying substantive disagreement by state courts.").
120. See, e.g., Galie, supra note 2, at 786 ("Justification for divergencies based solely on
ideological differences, however, is more problematic."); see also Developments in the Law,
supra note 32, at 1359 (courts and commentators have distaste for result-oriented decisionmaking).
121. See Galie, supra note 2, at 786 (decisions based on ideological grounds lack neutral
criteria); see also supra note 114 and accompanying textual discussion of the concept of neutral
principles.
122. If a state court says it is deciding on the basis of its constitution, it seems disingenuous
to assume the opposite. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (based on state
constitution, evidence obtained through defective search warrants inadmissible); see also Case
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: The Fifth Circuit's "Good Faith"Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule - Well-Reached or Overeached?, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 300 (1981) (examines United States
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holding really matter if the court is consistent?12 As long as the state

court is reasonably consistent, the criticism of a lack of neutral principles is groundless, and amounts to nothing more than a plea for
consistency with federal case law.12
Critics omit the most perplexing aspect of this argument. If one
assumes as a premise that state decisions lack neutral principles, what
then is the conclusion? If the conclusion is to disallow state-based

decisions, state constitutions are then rendered moot, inexorably
changing the historical meaning of federalism.1 26 In actual practice,
state court decisions diverging from the Supreme Court are probably
just as principled as other decisions, and once again the critics are
those who disagree with the decisions. State courts do, of course,
have a responsibility to explain the grounds for their decisions, but
unless this is conspicuously absent from the opinion, there is little
1 27
reason for concern.
The claim that judges are "activist" when they resolve issues under
state constitutions is a familiar one. iasCritics have made this allegation
both with regard to the United States Supreme Court, especially in

v. Williams and development of exclusionary rule); see generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 24-31 (discussion of "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule). But see
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence produced by good faith reliance on an
invalid search warrant admissible).
124. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1360 ("The quality of a court's reasoning
is not determined by the kinds of factors that lead it away from the federal starting point.").
Demonstrating intent or motivation always presents proof problems. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 585-86 (difficulties with proving discriminatory
purpose under equal protection analysis).
125. See Singer, supra note 113, at 276.
126. Such a conclusion might also be unconstitutional.
127. See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 448. Wilkes says that a general review of all federal and
state decisions would be a great burden on the Supreme Court's case load and invade the
"healthy federalism" required by the dual judiciary system. Id.; see also W. REYNOLDS, s2pra
note 96, at 58-59. Reynolds points out a goal of written opinions is to "provide a check on
arbitrary decisionmaking." Id. at 58. In addition, reasoned opinions promote certainty and
provide notice of what the law is in a given instance, and what it should be in an analogous
situation. Id. at 59; cf. Dworkin, "Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
Dworkin uses the figure of Hercules as a mythical judge powerful enough to contemplate a
justification for a decision based on the totality of the legal order. Id. at 166. That is to say, a
judge should attempt to reconcile his decision with the overall system of law. Id. The resulting
decision will be consistent with the system and provide for unity of law. Id.
128. See Singer, supra note 113, at 276 (judges are accused of illegitimate activism); see
generally Galie, supra note 2 (examines the four major areas in which courts are accused of
being activist).
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the Warren Court years, and individual state courts. 129 In this context,
activism has a negative connotation and is scorned as an act beyond
the proper power of the courts. 130
Narrowly defined, elimination of "activism" can create unusual
holdings completely at odds with legal intent and common sense. For
example, in Deem v. Millikin,1' the court was faced with the dilemma
of either interpreting a statute beyond its express wording or allowing
a child who murdered his mother to inherit her property. 3 2 Incredibly,
the court decided that it could not undertake an enterprise it considered to be judicial legislation, and allowed the inheritance to stand.13
Because the statute included no exceptions the court thought the legislature had intentionally precluded exceptions to the general rule that
children inherit property of a parent dying intestate. 3 4

129. With regard to the Warren Court's activism, see A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 103-04
(Warren Court quick to impose same norms on federal and state governments); Note, supra
note 46, at 231 (judicial activism of the Supreme Court). A good deal of discussion has also
been generated by state court actions. See Hancock, supra note 4 (three models of state court
activism examined); Howard, supra note 16, at 878-79 (six areas of traditional state activity
examined).
130. A fundamental tenet of the positivists is that judges exercise discretion where there
is no law that directly resolves an issue. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-42
(1961). Hart, like Austin and other legal positivists, expresses a concern for the discretion of
the judge. Judges are to follow the law, and reserve creativity for issues the law has not
resolved. Id. With regard to judges' authority, Hart states:
At any given moment judges . . . are parts of a system the rules of which are
determinate enough at the centre to supply standards of correct judicial decision
.... Any individual judge coming to his office... finds a rule ... accepted as
the standard for the conduct of that office. This circumscribes, while allowing, the
creative activity of its occupants.
Id. Thus, Hart perceives the rules of the game to be settled for the most part, and only action
outside the rules takes on a creative favor. But see L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 87 (Fuller
sees no dichotomy between following the law and exercising discretion, and states that both
are "inescapably creative").
131. 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (Cir. Ct. 1892), affd, 53 Ohio St. 668 (1895).
132. Id. at 358. The court explained:
The statute of descents provides in clear terms that where one dies intestate and
seized in fee of lands, they shall descend and pass to the children of such intestate;
and the courts cannot, upon considerations of policy, so interpret the statute so
as to exclude from the inheritance one who murders such intestate.
Id. at 357.
133. Id. at 360. The court says when statutes are ignored, the result is judicial legislation
in disguise. Id.
134. Id. at 361. The court stated: 'The natural inference is that when [the legislature]
incorporated the general rule into the statute, and omitted the exception, they intended that
there should be no exception to the rule of inheritance prescribed." Id.
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The Deem court criticized a similar case that disallowed murderers

from inheriting an estate under any circumstances, although the statute in question listed no express exceptions. 135 The Deem court considered that decision a notorious example of a court invading the
province of the legislature by improperly substituting its own opinion
for the policy of the legislators.36 This narrow, literal reading of a
statute because of excessive adherence to the letter of the law is
counterproductive, but is the end result of courts restrained from
"activism."137

Any suggestion that courts should not venture beyond certain boundaries, lest they substitute their own wills for the will of the Supreme
Court, belies a misinterpretation of the functions of state adjudication
and the role of federalism. 13 Courts may not safely assume that all
legislative intent is expressed on the face of the statute. 39 In fact,
state courts have a positive duty to be activist, not only in fulfilling
their obligations to the people of the state in which they sit, '40 but
1
also in performing their role in our dual system of federalism.14

135. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
136. Deem, 6 Ohio C.C. at 360. The court stated: "The decision in Riggs v. Palmer is the
manifest assertion of a wisdom believed to be superior to that of the legislature upon a question
of policy." Id.
137. An early case, Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584), describes what has
become perhaps the prime method of statutory interpretation, namely, a purposive interpretation. A four-step analytical framework assists in arriving at the interpretation of statutes in
general. The considerations are as follows: what was the common law before the statute was
made; what mischief and defect did the common law not provide for; what remedy did Parliament
appoint to cure the disease; and the true reason for the remedy. Id. This type of purposive
interpretation is endorsed by L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 82-83. Fuller states this is the
best short answer to the question of how judges should interpret statutes in conformity with
the whole legal system. Id. at 82. See generally W. REYNOLDS, supra note 96, at 192-286
(comprehensive overview of statutory interpretation with analysis of major theories).
138. See supra notes 1 & 5 and accompanying text.
139. The Deem court followed the Plain Meaning Rule. See W. REYNOLDS, supra note 96,
at 215-20. The Plain Meaning Rule provides that as long as the language is "plain," no outside
evidence such as legislative history should be admitted. Id. at 215. The problem is in determining
when language is 'plain." Id. at 217. Hart seems to think that language often has fixed meaning
and is clear. See H. HART, supra note 130, at 122-32. Hart states, albeit with qualification: "In
contrast with the indeterminancies of examples [precedents], the communication of general
standards by explicit forms of general language... seems clear, dependable, and certain." Id.
at 122. But see L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 227. Fuller disagrees with Hart's core of settled
meaning of language. As an example of the difficulty of language, Fuller discusses the Statute
of Frauds. Id. at 88-89. Fuller states that "few statutory enactments have given rise to so many
discordant and bizarre interpretations." Id. at 88.
140.

See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977) (a court applying, e.g.,

due process or equal protection clauses as law "must be an activist court," since it must answer
questions of morality); see also State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 373, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984),
where Utter states: "[Sitate courts have a duty to independently interpret and apply their state
constitutions . ..

141.

."

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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Another criticism holds that state courts do not have adequate
experience in dealing with matters outside traditional state law and
should therefore hesitate to "constitutionalize" new areas into their
domain.1 2 State courts, it is contended, do not have standards sufficient to guide them through the complexities of modern issues, and
this lack of guidance becomes critical when state courts act as de facto
legislative bodies.14 Moreover, state constitutions may be imprecise
in language and unclear in intent, leaving judges with little or no
guidance. 144
In truth, however, state courts have a great deal of experience
with federal constitutional issues.145 While adjudication under a state's
own constitution may present some differences, the federal experience
cannot be irrelevant. Nor have commentators shown that using state
constitutions is so difficult a task as to be beyond the capacity of state
judges.1 46 On the contrary, many courts have developed and are utilizing clear-cut methodologies1 47 to make independent, state-based deter-

minations. 148
142.

See Howard, supra note 16, at 942 (state judges should "strongly consider" social and

other costs of constitutionalizing any area).
143. Id. at 943. Howard expressed reticence in allowing states to enter new fields:
Another danger . . is that invitations to a court to explore new terrain often
entail the risk of going where there simply are no ascertainable standards to guide
the judge. Natural law may be a great philosophical tradition, but it is a dubious
guide for judges. When the Supreme Court embarked on its long and unhappy
career as superlegislature in economic matters, it used what Justice Black often
referred to as a "natural law due process" formula.
Id.
144. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 5, at 521. Justice Utter points out that state constitutions
are sometimes unclear, leaving no guidance for the judge. Id. While this may indeed be the
case, Justice Utter does not urge states to stay their hand, but rather points out that many
aids are available to judges. Id. at 492. Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court has been an
especially avid advocate of interpretation based on the Washington Constitution. See, e.g., State
v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984) (WAsH. CONST. art. I, § 7
prohibits entering an arrestee's domicile without a search warrant); State v. White, 97 Wash.
2d 92, 112, 640 P.2d 1061, 1072 (1982) (en banc) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 requires exclusion
of evidence obtained under unconstitutional stop and identify statute); State v. Fain, 94 Wash.
2d 387, 391-92, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 prohibits life imprisonment
of defendant with record of three minor felonies).
145. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 20 (state courts
review constitutionality of both state and federal laws).
146. See generally Carson, "Last Things Last": A MethodologicalApproach to Legal Arguinent in State Courts, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 641 (1983). Justice Carson of the Oregon
Supreme Court urges lawyers to adopt a procedure for preparing a case for trial and appellate
review. Id. at 642.
147. See, e.g., id. at 653-63. Carson has sections describing the sequence, methodology,
form, and research techniques that are available. Id.
148. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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Some writers seem to put far too much emphasis on federal
guidelines and standards.149 Courts' mechanically applying standards
may increase certainty, but only at the expense of reason.150 Standards
serve as guideposts rather than as justice machines, and if states lack
such mechanisms, so much the better. 15'
Dworkin advanced a theory of adjudication as "naturalism," not
based on rigid standards. 152 A judge can decide new cases in a creative
fashion, while building on existing precedents.'1- The judge first studies
the work of other judges, which in our application might require a
state court judge to review Supreme Court decisions if no state decisions were on point. The judge then reviews prior law to see what
previous judges have done to continue the "chain of law."' This system
of adjudication provides the working model for interpreting all types
of cases coming before the court. The interpretation is not a mechanical process, which Dworkin strongly objects to, but rather a style of
adjudication for both routine cases and cases of first impression.
This theory is important to federalism because the criticism of a
lack of standards may be less important than it appears on the surface.

149. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 15, at 943; see also Developments in the Law, supra
note 32, at 1357 (state court decisionmaking will lack cogency when federal protections are
extensive).
150. See supra notes 131 & 135-37 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., R. POUND, supra note 33, at 70-71. Pound says rules and standards have
their basis respectively in intelligence and intuition. Id. at 70. If Pound is correct, then a lack
of standards might not be as important as some critics of state courts suggest, since standards
may be intuitionally based. Surely no reasonable claim that state court judges are less intuitive
would be advanced. Pound continues to state: "For the certainty attained by mechanical applicaton of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory." Id. at 71.
152. Dworkin, supra note 127, at 165-73.
153. Id. at 168.
154. Id. Dworkin views the judge as having a responsibility to continue the case law
developed in a consistent manner, a so-called "chain of law," much like a group of novelists
writing a collective novel would have to pay great attention to all preceding chapters, lest the
novel not be consistent. Id. at 166-68.
155. Id. at 171. Dworkin explains: "This account of the main structure of a working theory
of interpretation has heuristic appeal. It provides judges, and others who interpret the law,
with a model they might use in identifying the approach they have been using, and self-consciously
to inspect and improve that model." Id. Dworkin understands his theory to reflect what judges
already do, not what they might do or should do. According to Dworkin, the theory is indicative
of the way the system works: "The rights thesis has two aspects. Its descriptive aspect explains
the present structure of the institution of adjudication." For a discussion of the rights thesis,
see id. at 82-90.
156. Dworkin, supra note 127, at 173 (judges can apply the model to both routine and
non-routine cases).
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Guidance from newly developed methodological approaches, 157 prior
experience with federal constitutional issues, and a general framework
of naturalism as Dworkin suggested'8 all mitigate any disadvantages
from lack of prior adjudication.
Finally, one must note that state provisions are often different
from federal provisions.'1 9 Even when both documents contain the
same language, interpretation may differ. 160 A state provision may not
have a federal counterpart, and thus courts may not be able to rely
on federal decisions. 16' Under these circumstances as well, states would
be best able to resolve issues by using the state rather than federal
Constitution. In fact, some states, such as Florida, have built-in
"reach-down" provisions that allow for quicker resolution of conflicts
than the federal system. '6
B.

Perceived Dangers in Diversity

The American brand of federalism allows states to develop laws
independent of the national government. 163 This distresses Justice

157. See Carson, supranote 146, at 653-63 (suggested method for dealing with state constitutional issues).
158. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 401 (state constitutional rights may be different,
sometimes providing affirmative rights or judicial review).
160. See id. at 402-03. Williams points out that textual differences should not be viewed
as a "condition precedent" to independent state adjudication. Id. at 402. In addition, sister state
decisions should be given more weight than federal decisions under a horizontal federalism
concept. See id. at 403.
161. See, e.g., Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
169, 188 (1983) (state constitutions may have rights with no federal analogue).
162. See, e.g., England, Hunter, & Williams, Constitutional Jurisdictionof the Supreme
Covrt of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147, 193-96 (1980). The Florida provision
allows the Florida Supreme Court to
[rieview any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the district court of
appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to have
a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state, and
certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5). The reason for creating the provision was to allow the state
supreme court to decide important issues necessary for administration of justice. England,
Hunter, & Williams, supra, at 195. A second reason for the reach down provision was to save
time by pulling up the case to the supreme court. Id. The authors note that, in the Nixon tapes
case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the United States Supreme Court took
jurisdiction from the District Court Judge, John Sirica, under a provision similar to Florida's
section 3(b)(5). Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(c) (1976)).
163. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

O'Connor because she desires uniformity of law.' 6 Uniformity must
be distinguished from consistency. When Justice O'Connor argues for
uniformity, she wants the law to be same in each jurisdiction.'1 Consistency, on the other hand, pertains to a system whose laws do not
contradict each other,1 66 but fit together in the overall scheme of the
system.1 67 Thus, the legal system of an individual state may be internally consistent without being uniform with the laws of other states.
Nor does our concept of federalism require uniformity for laws among
the states.' 6 Each state may develop laws in accord with the social
morality of its own residents.169

The American legal system is uniform in one regard: federal protections are the inalterably mandated minimum for all states.' 7 The
states, however, determine the extent to which state protection of

individual liberty may ascend, and in that regard state protections
may vary. 171 The Continental Congress considered but rejected the

possibility of having uniform constitutions for the states, in favor of
each state's writing its own constitution. 172 Retaining state sovereignty
was a prerequisite to adopting the federal Constitution, and is the
cornerstone in American federalism. 73
The resulting diversity, however, is not as great as one would
imagine. 174 In fact, the similarity dates from the original period in

164. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("[Ilt cannot be doubted that there
is an important need for uniformity in federal law ..
"); supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
165. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. Justice O'Conor's opinion expresses implicit concern for
complexity of law by her desire to avoid the need to examine state law in testing the validity
of the state grounds. See id.
166. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 65-70. One of Fuller's eight requirements for
optimal legality in any system is consistency. Id. at 65. Avoiding contradictions in the law is a
difficult task for a legislator, but to the extent it is achieved, legality is increased.
167. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 140, at 105-30. Dworkin uses Hercules, a superhuman
judge, to fit laws into their proper framework so as to maintain a consistent system. Id. at 107.
168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Collins, supra note 49, at 420
(citation omitted) ("[S]imply because the United States Supreme Court has decided that some
claim of right is not secured under the federal Bill of Rights does not mean, of course, that the
same claim must fail under every other law in the land. That is the splendor of federalism.").
169. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 193 (criticizing the positivists for ignoring
the social dimension of the interaction between the lawgiver and the citizens).
170. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 23, at 395 (irreducible national standards are binding).
171. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 23, at 381 (politicians debated uniform constitutions for
the states, but rejected the idea).
173. Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
174. See Williams, supra note 161, at 172 (state constitutions do not differ greatly).
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which states wrote their constitutions. 175 Many constitutions use similar
language, with similar effect on legal and governmental issues.176 The
present Supreme Court has encouraged, perhaps unintentionally, the
diversity Justice O'Connor argued against in Long.1- By reviewing
state decisions where adequate and independent grounds are not
clear,' 78 the Court has encouraged states to use their own state law
to avoid review, resulting in precisely the diversity the Long majority
sought to prevent.' 79
A final criticism examined here is that state constitutional adjudication on independent grounds complicates the legal system. 1 ° Although the criticism is unquestionably accurate, this complexity may
simply be the price of the dual system of federalism.181 Since there
are already fifty state constitutions and a federal Constitution, any
additional complication should be worth the effort when the costs are
weighed against the possible gains. 1
The costs, of course, are the variation of rights in each jurisdiction,
but the variation applies only to the upper limit of those rights. 183 The

175. See, e.g., Grad, The State Constitution:Its Function and Formfor Our Time, 54 VA.
L. REV. 928, 941 (1968). Grad wrote:
The general similarity of all these early state constitutions is another circumstance
worthy of remark. The ready acceptance of closely parallel institutions, formulas
and political ideas, by communities so unlike each other in the life and habits of
their people and in their industrial and commercial interests, was beyond the
expectation of many of the best minds of the day.
Id.
176. See Williams, supra note 161, at 227.
177. See supra note 164.
178. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Cover, supra note 1, at 224 ('The
overarching of federal law has moved state judges to view federal law both as a growing
constraint on the operation of state law and as a source of inspiration for the development of
a state jurisprudence.").
179. See Welsh, supra note 4, at 822 (footnote omitted). ('Wittingly or unwittingly, the
Burger Court's policy of reversing expansive state judgments plays into the hands of those who
would impose greater political control on state judges.").
180. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 24, at 393. Linde argues that state adjudication is beneficial,
but clearly articulates the argument made by others: 'Diversity between state and federal
constitutional rights complicates the work of lawyers and courts, particularly below the state
supreme court. The law is complicated enough. There is little to be gained in return for the
trouble. The game is not worth the candle." Id.
181. See Linde, supra note 24, at 392 ("As lawyers we know well that individual rights
differ from state to state. That is what a federal system means.").
182. See also Collins, supra note 49, at 372 (since 1970 more than 250 state court decisions
raised ceiling of federally mandated minimums).
183. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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potential benefit of issue resolution under state constitutions is that

states do not have to be satisfied with the minimal,,' and presently
shrinking, protections afforded by the United States Supreme Court.'
V.

THE STATES' RESPONSES IN PRACTICE

States generally respond to the opportunity to resolve issues under
their own constitutions in one of three ways: the dependent, "lock step"
approach; the interstitial, "gap filler' method; or the independent means
of analysis. The ramifications of using each of these methods is
86
examined seriatim.'
A.

Dependent, "Lock Step" Approach
The first method, here termed the dependent, or "lock step" approach, ties a state court's decisions on one or more issues to the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Florida has followed this method in the fourth amendment area and serves as an
example of the lock step approach.
In 1982, Florida voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that has had major ramifications on criminal procedure and
federalism. 187 The amendment begins with wording identical to the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, 18 but includes

184. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 4, at 856 (footnote omitted) ("The Burger Court's brand
of federalism, it would appear, only rewards one kind of state experimentation: experiments
conducted in the service of narrowing rights.").
186. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1332-34 (identifying the three categories
as Classical, Autonomy, and Supremacy).
187.

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982). The amendment reads in full as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant
shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence
to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment
to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For comparative purposes the federal amendment reads as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
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a statement that the right must be construed in conformity with the
federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 1 9 Thus,
for better or worse, Florida now follows the Supreme Court's lead in
the search and seizure area.
Analysis of the statute raises several questions about the application of the amendment. 190 First, if the Supreme Court reverses a prior
fourth amendment holding or renders an unclear ruling, what then is
the Florida law? Lower courts might justifiably ponder whether to
follow the previous Florida Supreme Court holding, which was then
in conformity with the federal ruling, or follow the new decision of
the United States Supreme Court.' 9' Such a dilemma confuses the
present force of the law, potentially creating a law unconstitutional
" Ironically, the United States Supreme
for lack of notice. 19
Court might
find such a state decision unconstitutional for failure to give the proper
notice required by procedural due process. 193
In addition, state constitutional amendments are often the result
of emotional public debate. 9 Since most state constitutions are easily
T

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
For a detailed discussion of the Florida amendment, see generally Slobogin, State Adoption of
Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's"ForcedLinkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 653 (1987).
189. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982); cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1974,
amended 1979) (on busing decisions California ties in its adjudication to Supreme Court).
190. See generally Linde, supra note 24, at 395. Linde would be reluctant to put the Bill
of Rights to a referendum, and is relieved we do not have to do so. See id. But cf. Van Alstyne,
supra note 105, at 218-19. Van Alstyne thinks the sentiment that the people do not believe in
the Bill of Rights is "oversold." Id. at 219. In his view, part of the problem is that we view
the Constitution with fear and analyze it like an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy. Id.
This habit of being overly analytical of the Constitution's provisions is unhelpful. Id.
191. See Collins, supra note 49, at 403-04. Collins notes that procedural uncertainty from
Supreme Court cases provides a shaky framework for state reliance on federal law. Id. Cases
such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda), and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (good faith exception to the exclusionary rule),
are vague enough that their holdings cannot easily serve as guides. Id.
192. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 489 (notice and
procedural due process).
193. See generally Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: The Belated Demise of a Vagrancy Statute, 2.5 U. FLA. L. REV. 227 (1972) (analysis of procedural due process in light of Papachristou
x,.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
194. See Williams, supra note 2, at 382 ("These amendments usually arise in emotional
contexts, often in response to a decision concerning the rights of minorities, the powerless, or
other unpopular people.").
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amended, voters may react without adequate time for reflection and
consideration of the issues, leading to adoption of provisions that do
not work well in practice.195 Florida may experience problems with its
amendment if a future United States Supreme Court makes decisions
Floridians dislike.196 Florida politicians desiring to terminate the relationship with the Court might then find it difficult to convince voters
97
to abandon the highest court in the land.1
State-based adjudication has become somewhat of a cause c6l bre
for the Court, with individual justices advocating one or the other
viewpoint. 19s A particularly interesting case is Floridav. Casal, 99 in
which the "campaigning practice" is unusually direct.20 In Casal, the
Florida Supreme Court used the state constitution to affirm suppression of a large quantity of marijuana found on a fishing boat.2 0 1 Justice

Burger was dissatisfied with the decision and expressly blamed Florida
law rather than federal law for the "untoward result. '20 2 Although
Justice Burger accepted the majority's determination that adequate
and independent state grounds were present, he doubted that the
Florida Constitution required suppression of the evidence 2 03 since the
state's jurisprudence was tied to the federal Constitution's fourth
amendment.204 Justice Burger noted that the Florida court had "appar-

195. See, e.g., Galie, supra note 2, at 791 (state constitutions are relatively easy to amend).
196. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 24, at 395. Linde notes the national version of constitutional
protections may not always be what the nation would want. Id.
197. See id. Linde describes Supreme Court decisions as made "by the faraway oracles in
the marble temple." Id. Florida may have to settle with the oracle.
198 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 396 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(on remand the state may reach contrary resolution under state law); see also Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing to specific provision in
Michigan Constitution to demonstrate how the state could have resolved the issue under state
law); see generally Brennan, supra note 5 (saluting states' expansiveness in interpretation of
rights).
199. 462 U.S. 637 (1983).
200. See Bator, supra note 2, at 606 n.1 ("I regard it as inappropriate for Supreme Court
Justices themselves to campaign to enact into unreviewable state constitutional law dissenting
views about federal constitutional law which have been duly rejected by the United States
Supreme Court.").
201. Casal, 462 U.S. at 637.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 638. Justice Burger states: "I question that anything in the language of either
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Art. I, § 12, of the Florida
Constitution required suppression of the drugs as evidence." Id.
204. Id. Justice Burger cited directly to the Florida constitutional amendment and incorporated the full amendment into his concurring opinion. Id.
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'ently" decided the case on independent state grounds,2 05 which meant
6
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review it.20
Chief Justice Burger again cited the Florida amendment and quoted
the text in full.207 After briefly discussing the Florida statute that led
to the disapproved result, Justice Burger made the following surprising
statement: "[W]hen state courts interpret state law to require more
than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must
be aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure
rational law enforcement. '' 208 The statement is surprising because it is
tantamount to a wholesale rejection of the historical meaning of
federalism.20 9 Chief Justice Burger's language suggests that the Florida
decision was irrational, and that the Supreme Court has a monopoly
on proper adjudication.210 Given the tenor of his opinion, it is difficult
to understand why Justice Burger concurred.
In reviewing the dependent, lock step approach with Florida's constitutional amendment as an example, serious questions emerge relating to application. This method of tying state decisions to the federal
branch is antithetical to federalism2 "1 and effectively breaches the duty
of the state2 2 to serve as the prime protector of individual liberties
2 3
for state residents. '
B.

Interstitial, "Gap Filler"Approach

The second response, the interstitial, or "gap filler" approach, is
a hybrid of the dependent and independent approaches. Under the
gap filler approach, a state court consciously decides to utilize its own
constitution only if no United States Supreme Court decision has previously resolved the issue,24 or if the Court's pronouncements are too
205. Id.
206. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
207. Casal, 462 U.S. at 638.
208. Id. at 639.
209. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
210. See Williams, sup-ra note 2, at 402 (Supreme Court has no "Monopoly" on correct
constitutional decisionmaking).
211. See, e.g., id. at 404 (reliance on Supreme Court interpretation "constitutes an unwarranted delegation of state power to the Supreme Court and a resultant abdication of state
judicial responsibility.").
212. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 24, at 380 (state courts have primary responsibility of
protecting those rights that impact on a citizen's everyday life, such as landlord-tenant rights
and custody rights).
213. See, e.g., id. at 383 (since state constitutions were first in time and logic, states should
always first consult own constitutions before federal Constitution).
214. See, e.g., Developnents in the Law, supra note 32, at 1356 (the interstitial view fills
open spaces in federal adjudication).
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unclear to provide an answer. 215 The state renounces its own federalis-

tic powers and submits to the judgment of the Supreme Court.21r The
federal minimum usually becomes the state's maximum as well under
this approach, since the state does not attempt to build a coherent

jurisprudential body of law based on its constitution.217
In practice, this approach is not very different from the dependent,

lock step approach 2l because federal law is so pervasive that compara-

tively few gaps remain for a state willing to let the Supreme Court
settle its law.219 On the other hand, state constitutions can resolve

many issues, ° and foreclosing the option of considering state arguments dissolves the essence of federalism by abrogating the state's
responsibility to provide the other half of the dual protection.2'
C.

Independent Approach

The final method is the independent approach. Under this practice,
a state always looks first to its own constitution, and only reaches
the federal Constitution when the issues cannot be resolved under
state law.-

This approach represents the trend, and the list of states

looking to their own constitutions has grown dramatically in the last
215. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
216. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1357 ("For state constitutional law
to assume a realistic role, state courts must acknowledge the dominance of federal law and
focus directly on the gap-filling potential of state constitutions.").
217. Id. at 1358: "The state court's role is not to construct a complete system of fundamental
rights from the ground up." Contra Linde, supra note 24, at 384: "But a state court should put
things in their logical sequence and routinely examine its state law first, before reaching a
federal issue."
218. See supra notes 187-213 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 5, at 489-90. Justice Brennan refers to 1933 when many
federal agencies, which would have a profound impact on the nation's people, were created. Id.
at 489. But prior to the expansion of federal law, states were for the most part unconcerned
about federal law. Id. at 490; see also Linde, supra note 44, at 173-74. Linde points out that
law students are educated almost exclusively in federal constitutional law, and are therefore
often unaccustomed to dealing with issues under state law. Id.
220. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 49, at 385 ("[S]tate judges have it within their power to
render a wide cross section of final judgments based on state law ....");see also supra note
24 and accompanying text (references to various protections provided by states).
221. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Justice Black described federalism
as
[a] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id.
222. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1356-57 (refers to the approach
as the "primacy" model); see generally Linde, supra note 24 (leading article on state-based
adjudication).
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decade.: Since the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long
inadvertently encouraged independent decisionmaking, even more
states will join the trend in the future.224
Washington- and Oregon22 6are among the states that try to resolve
issues first under their state constitutions. Both states consider their
227
constitutions the primary protectors of their residents' civil liberties.
In fact, these courts consider laws in the inverse of the order most
courts follow: both states work from the bottom up.228 The states first
consider local laws, such as municipal ordinances and administrative
regulations.2 Next, the courts examine state laws, and finally, if the
decision is still not resolved, they look to the federal Constitution.2 0
This procedure, although perhaps different from the tenets of present
since no federal question
legal education,2 1 is both efficient and 2logical,
2
exists if state law protects the right.

223. See Utter, supra note 5, at 499 n.29. Utter lists a number of states that have enlarged
individual rights beyond those of the federal government on the basis of their state constitutions.
Id. The list, which does not attempt to be definitive, includes some 28 states, although now
the list would certainly be longer. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 32 (full
listing of cases held under state constitutional provisions).
224. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
225. See Utter, supra note 4, at 524 (Washington judges have a duty to first examine rights
under the state's constitution). For application of the state's policy, see generally State v.
Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (limits search incident after arrest to area
within arrestee's control); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (defendants
charged with possessory crimes have automatic standing to challenge admissibility of evidence
obtained in illegal search); Federated Publications v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980)
(press can be excluded from a pre-trial hearing to protect the defendant under the Washington
Constitution).
226. See Carson, supra note 146, at 64749 (explains four reasons for putting the Oregon
Constitution first in examining constitutional issues). For application of the Oregon view, see
generally State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982) (search reasonable under Oregon
Constitution when relevant in light of all facts); State v. Scharf, 288 Or. 451, 605 P.2d 690
(1980) (after counsel is denied, breath test for intoxication not admissible); State v. Mendacino,
288 Or. 281, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979) (confession to psychiatrist before arraignment not admissible
because of prior inadmissible confessions).
227. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 5, at 524 ('The Washington Declaration of Rights is the
primary guarantor of the rights of Washingtonians."); see also Carson, supra note 146, at 643
("The Oregon rule is first things first.").
228. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 146, at 64243. Justice Carson suggests dealing with
"Last Things Last." Id. at 642. The last thing is the United States Constitution. Id. at 645.
229. Id. at 643.
2.30. Id. at 644-45. Carson admonished Oregon practitioners: "If you practice in Oregon, do
not start with constitutional issues . . . ." Id. at 643.
2.31. Id. (starting at the bottom of the ladder and climbing up is not the way most lawyers
were trained).
2:32.Id. at 648 (look first at state constitution as a matter of constitutional logic); see also
Linde, supra note 24, at 380 ("State bills of rights are first in two senses: first in time and
first in logic.").
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Courts can always justify state-based decisionmaking when the
federal wording on point is different. But even when wording in
state and federal provisions is identical, state interpretation may
reasonably differ.2 4 In attempting to interpret a constitutional provision, the court will consider the intent of the framers.25 Since states
are more aware of the current attitudes of their residents, they are
better able to decide intent and resolve issues in accord with the
residents' ideals of justice and reciprocity. 236 As one writer pointed
out, just because the drafters of a Northwestern constitution used
wording identical to what the Eastern framers used in the federal
237
Bill of Rights does not mean the intent was the same.
Supreme Court Justices sitting in Washington, D.C. are necessarily
removed from the activities of the states. State court judges, however,
are more accountable to state residents because they are usually
elected or appointed for a fixed term subject to reelection.2 In fact,
California voters recently reminded the nation of the power of popular
accountability by ousting the Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court.? 9

233. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 2, at 785. Galie says the clearest justification for a state
using its own constitution is when the language is different from the federal document. Id.
Additional justification is given if the state has a history or tradition calling for a more expansive
reading. Id. But see Linde, supra note 44, at 181. Linde does not believe textual differences
are required for divergence from the Supreme Court. Id.
234. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 5, at 500 (examples "abound" of states not following
the Supreme Court though texts identical); Swindler, supra note 7, at 15 (identical language in
two texts need not require same interpretation); see also supra note 8.
235. See supra note 137.
236. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 400 (state courts are closer to state affairs); see
also supra note 33 (explanation of "reciprocity").
237. Utter, supra note 5, at 498.
238. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1351-52; see Williams, supra note 2, at
400 (state courts more accountable than federal courts); cf. N. HORN., supra note 55, at 38-39.
German judges are appointed with the close involvement of both chambers of the Federal
Parliament. Id. at 39. Each chamber selects half of the judges for the Federal Constitutional
Court, while judges for the highest courts of ordinary jurisdiction are appointed by joint panels
from both chambers. Id. The Basic Law stipulates that judges are independent and subject only
to the law, and may not be dismissed against their will except as allowed by the Law on the
Judiciary. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 97 (W. Ger.). Although it would seem German judges are
almost totally independent, this is not the case. See N. HORN, supra note 55, at 39. Since the
judiciary is a career service in Germany, judges begin in courts of first instance, and advance
from there. Id. at 37-38. Promotion, however, is dependent upon the judge's performance, and
if his decisions have been poorly reasoned, he will probably not advance. Id. at 39.
239. See Time, Feb. 26, 1987, at 67.
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Overall, the independent approach taken by an increasing number
of states best preserves the meaning and purpose of federalism 0° By
allowing each state to decide independently what protections it will
provide, rather than merely parroting the views of the Supreme
Court,2 1 state residents receive the benefit of the dual protection of
federalism,2 2 and have a judiciary that is both accountable to them

and mindful of their special history, culture, and tradition.243
VI.

RECOMMENDED APPROACHES

A. For States
'Federalism is not the exclusive domain of the federal government.'2 4 States have a responsibility to resolve independently issues

confronting their own residents, without waiting passively for signals
from Washington.-, The history and culture of each state is different,
and state courts are in the best position to resolve matters concerning
local residents. 6
States should always examine state law before turning to the federal Constitution.2 7 In many cases, state law will resolve the issue
and the court will not need to consider the federal issue.24 A methodology of approaching issues from the local level, to the state level, and
finally to the federal level is the most logical and efficient means of
resolving conficts. 9

240. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 49, at 420 ('There is a role, an important one, to be
played by the states in securing freedom. During the course of this decade we are likely to see
more responsibility placed on the shoulders of state officials, including state judges.").
241. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 140, at 250. According to Dworkin, a moral conviction
cannot be based on prejudice, mere emotions, rationalization, or parroting. Id. Parroting is
defined as citing the moral beliefs of others without relying on one's moral conviction. Id. Thus,
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court on issues constitutionally tied to decisions of the United
States Supreme Court might not qualify as moral positions.
242. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 5, at 491 (without "independent protective force of
state law," full rights not assured).
243. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 5, at 498 (differences in culture and local conditions of
State of Washington from the east coast suggest documents with same language reflect different
philosophies).
244. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 227 (states are not mere provinces).
245. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 225 (duty to examine rights under state constitution).
246. See Williams, supra note 2, at 400, and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 24 (state law is first in time and logic).
248. Linde, supra note 24, at 383 (when a state protects a right there is no federal issue).
249. Id. at 384 (state law should be examined in logical sequence, before the federal Constitution).
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While all states must adhere to the minimum, or lowest common
denominator of protections provided by the federal Constitution,:7u the
maximum is the exclusive concern of the states.' 1 In Michigan v.
Long, 2 the Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to review state
decisions that were formerly unreviewable under the independent
grounds doctrine. State courts must therefore take special care to
meet Long's mechanical test by declaring clearly that state law is the
ground for the decision and that any federal references are used merely
for guidance without compelling the result.2
Independent state decisionmaking faces two potential obstacles.
First, Michigan v. Long does not rule out an evaluation of the veracity
of the state ground declaration,2 5 and until the Court's actions demonstrate conclusively that they will not undertake such an evaluation,
the most prudent course of action would be for a state court to omit
from the face of its opinion references to federal decisions. Second,
states should treat all reversals as remands by the Supreme Court,
and freely affirm on state grounds.? 6 In all situations, states must
utter the magic words to prevent what many think is an unwarranted
7
intrusion into state affairs.2
Florida courts in particular should begin to give greater consideration to the state constitution. While the state appears locked in for
the present to Supreme Court jurisprudence on search and seizure
under the fourth amendment,2 the state should ultimately attempt
to repeal the amendment that short circuits independent thinking.
Even if the constitutional amendment is not repealed, state courts can
still decide issues on the basis of Florida law, as the Florida Supreme
Court did in Floridav. Casal. 9 Of course, on other issues, the courts

250. See supra text accompanying note 41.
251. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
252. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
254. See supra text accompanying note 79.
255. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 49, at 400 n.87 (Michigan v. Long invites argument that
state grounds, though clearly stated, were not sufficient for the decision in seeking Supreme
Court review of a case).
256. See Roberts, supra note 40 ("As a practical matter, if a state court decision provides
greater protection under the federal law than the federal constitution requires, and the decision
is set aside by the United States Supreme Court, the original state decision may nevertheless
be reinstated on an independent state ground.").
257. See Welsh, supra note 4, at 857-58.
258. See s-upra note 187 and accompanying text.
259. 462 U.S. 637 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 199-210.
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are completely at liberty to decide cases in a manner that reflects the
state's unique history, culture, and ecology. 2 °
B.

For Practitioners

Practitioners should follow the cogent advice of criminal defense
lawyers and "take the first door out. '261 Taking the first door out
means making all fair arguments for a client rather than advancing
arguments in hope of achieving a landmark decision. 26 2 The saying is
especially applicable in the constitutional area, for lawyers should not
pass over local and state law in rushing to the federal Constitution.
Arguments presented on the basis of the state's own constitution will
carry considerable weight in many jurisdictions, and provide another
opportunity for a door out.
Attorneys should be especially mindful of the fact that federal and
state rights are not necessarily identical, even when the language in
2
the state document is exactly the same as the federal provision. 6
Lawyers should frame arguments under each document, for what may
fail on federal grounds may succeed on state grounds.
The trial court is the forum to present state constitutional arguments, since courts generally will not review issues raised for the first
time on appeal.2r 4 Attorneys should support state arguments with relevant, independent decisions and emphasize special state characteristics favoring resolution under state law. Lawyers should try to present
with great clarity any issues framed under state law, especially for
judges unaccustomed to dealing with the state constitution. Judges
will often be unaccustomed to addressing state arguments in areas
2
where the United States Supreme Court has been especially active. -

260. For recent developments regarding hazardous waste in Florida, see generally Note,
The Preemptive Scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980: Necessity for an Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 635 (1982) (need
for state to take active role in protecting residents from hazardous waste sites not considered
top priority by Environmental Protection Agency); see also, Note, Hazardous Waste and the
Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 253 (1986) (Florida law imposing strict liability on
innocent purchasers for hazardous waste abatement should be changed to eliminate injustice).
261. Carson, supra note 146, at 643.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 24, at 382 (fourteenth amendment has led many to believe
a "state's own guarantees must reflect whatever the United States Supreme Court finds in
their federal analogues").
264. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 146, at 642.
265. Linde, supra note 24, at 387. When state courts deal with claims not covered by
federal law, they are accustomed to making an analysis under state law. Id. But in areas where
the Supreme Court has been active, lawyers have not made arguments under the state constitution, and judges have abandoned use of the state document. Id.
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A final consideration is important to all practitioners: omitting state
law arguments may serve as grounds for a malpractice suit. Especially
in jurisdictions that commonly hear arguments under the state document, failure to at least raise the state protection may prove detrimental. 266
In addition to approaches that apply in the rest of the country,
Florida practitioners should recognize the opportunity to advocate
adoption of state grounds even in the fourth amendment area. Florida
v. Casal,26 7 for example, should have been a difficult case to win. The
Supreme Court decisions were clear, and looking at the face of
Florida's constitutional amendment, prior federal decisions should have
settled the case. The state, however, found independent grounds by
turning to a Florida statute. 268 Why a state statute should override
the constitutional amendment is manifestly unclear, but the result was
an adequate and independent state decision that temporarily cut the
2 69
tie to the United States Supreme Court decisions.
The importance of Casal is that the Florida court chose to break
from the Supreme Court in a difficult case. It would have been much
easier to decide on independent state grounds when textual differences
existed between federal and state provisions.2 0 For example, Florida's
Constitution has an extra protective clause in article I, section 12 that
has no fourth amendment counterpart.Y1 A Florida court could more
easily justify an independent decision on the fact that the federal
amendment does not address the issue.
Casal signals clearly to Florida practitioners to argue state law in
all cases, including search and seizure law. Florida attorneys should
also bring to the court's attention ambiguities in Supreme Court adjudication, and special Florida circumstances that make applying the federal law undesirable.

266. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 49, at 374 (omitting state constitutional arguments is at
the edge of malpractice).
267. 462 U.S. 637 (1983).
268. See id. (Burger, J., concurring); FLA. STAT. § 371.58 (1977). The statute allows a
safety inspection only with consent or probable cause. Contra United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (Federal case law, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1561(a) (1982), allows

inspection at any time).
269. Casal, 462 U.S. at 637.
270. See supra note 233.
271. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1982) (extra clause protects against "unreasonable interception of private communications by any means"); see supra note 187 for full text of
the amendment.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

A realignment of the historical meaning of federalism is well underway. States that once passively and mechanically accepted United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence have begun to explore their own
constitutions as a means of providing their residents with that vital
second layer of protection. States do not have to accept federally
defined minimum rights as the maximum rights for their residents.
Although the Supreme Court has recently expanded review of state
court decisions, states may make a clear statement of adequate and
independent grounds and disavow reliance on federal law. In this
manner, states may be able to contain further federal intrusion into
their interests.
The states will reassume their proper role in the American model
of federalism, and federal law will cease to be the beginning and end
of constitutional analysis. While states emerge as the new protectors
of civil liberties, federal law will lose its position of primacy.
Stephen F. Aton
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